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1Finance and Democracy in Africa
Abstract
The motivations  of the Arab Spring and hitherto unanswered questions about some of its 
dynamics inspired this paper, which focuses on how democracy, polity and autocracy  affect 
financial development dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size in Africa; contingent on 
religious-domination, income-levels and colonial-legacies. Findings could be summarized in the 
following. (1) Authoritarian regimes have a higher propensity to effect policies that favor the 
development of financial intermediary depth, activity and size. Democracy has important effects 
on the degree of competition for public offices but less significant effects in comparison with 
autocracy on policies towards financial development.  (2) Christian-dominated countries have 
higher (lower) levels of financial intermediation efficiency (depth) than-Islam oriented countries. 
(3) Income-levels also matter in financial development as poor countries have a lower propensity 
to improve their financial dynamics than wealthy states. (4) On average English common-law 
countries have better democratic institutions that their French civil-law counterparts. (5) There is 
evidence of a U-shape relationship between national wealth and the level of democracy, with 
Low-income countries experiencing lower (higher) levels of democracy than Upper (Lower) 
middle income countries. As a policy implication, once democracy is initiated, it should be 
accelerated (to edge the appeals of authoritarian regimes) and reap the benefits of level and time 
hypotheses in financial development.
JEL Classification: E40; E50; O10; P16; P50
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21.  Introduction
The relative importance of political regimes in economic growth, welfare, human 
liberties and financial development has marked the geo-political landscape of the African 
continent over the past couple of months. In three words, “the Arab Spring” has reignited the 
debate over the influence of political institutions on the destinies of those who depend on their 
policies for a livelihood.   Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Ivory Coast, 
Uganda, Zambia, Mauritania, Sudan, Western Sahara, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Oman, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia…etc  are countries  that have recently witnessed major or minor 
revolutions, through techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, 
demonstrations, marches and rallies, as well as the use of social-media to organize, communicate 
and raise awareness in the face of state attempts at repressions and internet censorship. 
  The motivations of these uprisings that have marked the history of humanity over the last 
few months have left political economists, researchers, governments and international policy 
makers pondering over the following concerns. How do national religious inclinations exert 
influence on financial dynamics? How do income levels matter in financial development? What 
bearing do legal origins have on financial development prospects? Do income-levels, dominant- 
religions and colonial-legacies matter in the quality of political regimes? How do democracy and 
autocracy affect financial development dynamics conditional on religious-domination, legal-
traditions and income brackets? Such are the concerns this work seeks to address.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews 
existing literature. Data and methodology are presented and outlined respectively in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.
32. Literature Review
2.1 Existing strands 
2.1.1 Democracy and growth
The relationship between political democracy and economic growth has been a center of 
debate over the past decades. A bulk of cross-country research has shown a theoretical divide on 
the impact of democratic versus authoritarian regimes on growth. Both theoretical and empirical 
literature are highly divided on the effects of democracy on economic growth. While from a 
theoretical perspective, Clague et al. (1996) and Haggard (1997) argue that democracy promotes 
economic growth better than autocratic regimes, Rao (1984) and Blanchard & Shleifer (2000) 
disagree. 
Proponents of democracy postulate that the motivations of citizens to work and invest, 
the effective allocation of resources in the marketplace and profit-maximization private activity 
can all be maintained in a climate of liberty, free-flowing information and secured control of 
property (North, 1990; Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2008). Democracies can infringe state 
intervention in the economy, improve responsiveness to public’s demand on areas such as 
education, justice and health, and most importantly encourage long-run and stable growth 
(Rodrik, 2000; Baum & Lake, 2001, 2003).
 Conversely, opponents of democracy posit that democracies lend themselves to popular 
demands for immediate consumption at the expense of profitable investments and can neither be 
insulated from the interest of rent-seekers nor mobilize resources swiftly. In the same vein, 
democracies are said to be prone to conflicts due to social, ethnic and class struggles. Whereas 
some authors subscribe to authoritarian regimes in efforts to suppress conflicts, resist sectional 
interests and take coercive measures necessary for rapid growth, others emphasize the role of 
4markets and institutions irrespective of political regime-type (Bhagwati, 1995).   Democracy 
presents a potential risk to growth because it is open to pressures from interest groups (Olson, 
1982). Rao (1984) postulates that two-thirds of the world’s population were living under 
nondemocratic forms of government because; democratic institutions fail to respond to the 
immediate demands of the population, impatient to raise its standard of living. In the assessment, 
authoritarian regimes orchestrate economic growth by sacrificing current consumption for 
investment, which makes them rather effective at mobilizing savings. Blanchard and Shleifer 
(2000) compare fiscal federalism in China and Russia to demonstrate that political centralization 
in China reduces both the risk of capture and the scope of competition for rents by local 
governments. Conversely, the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy in transitional 
Russia deters economic growth due to rampant local capture and competition for rents. 
Shen (2002) cuts adrift the cross-country mainstream approach to empirical examination 
of the democracy-growth nexus and proposes a “before-and-after” analytical technique. The 
paper compares the economic performance of forty countries before and after they became 
democracies or semi-democracies over the last four decades and finds evidence that an 
improvement in growth performance typically follows the transformation to democracy. In the 
same vein growth appears to be more stable under authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, rich 
countries often experience declines in growth after a democratic transformation whereas poor 
nations typically experience accelerations in growth. Growth change appears to be negatively 
associated with initial savings ratio and positively linked to the export ratio to GDP. 
Given the debate highlighted above, Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu(2008) challenge the 
consensus of an inconclusive relationship with a   meta-analytic review and a quantitative 
assessment of the democracy-growth literature. They apply meta-regressions to a population of 
5470 estimates derived from 81 papers on the democracy-growth association and conclude with 
the following. (1) Given overall available published works, there is on average no evidence of 
democracy being detrimental to growth since the former has no direct effect on the later. 
Evidence suggests only a robust and significant indirect effect on growth. (2) Results are 
consistent with democracies being associated with higher human capital accumulation, lower 
political instability, lower inflation and higher economic freedom. (3) Democracies are also 
found to be associated with larger governments and more restrictions to international trade. (4) 
The growth-effect of democratic regimes is higher in Latin America and lower in Asia but 
insignificant in Africa. 
2.1.2. Democracy and finance
The existing literature has stressed the role of political and legal institutions in promoting 
financial development, which is widely viewed as necessary for economic growth (King & 
Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998). Institutions that abide by the rule of law, protect property 
rights as well as contract enforcements and put effective constraints on rulers are established to 
be associated with higher levels of financial development (La Porta et al., 1998; Rajan & 
Zingales, 2003; Haber et al., 2007; Asongu, 2011abcd). 
From   a   fundamental   perspective,   powerful   sets   of   institutions   often   result   from 
democracy: a political system characterized by popular participation, political competition for 
public offices and institutional constraints on the rules (Siegle et al., 2004). For example 
democracy brings political checks and balances, responsiveness to citizens, self-correcting 
mechanisms, openness and other good institutions. La Porta et al. (2002) suggest that democratic 
regimes encourage financial development by discouraging government ownership of financial 
institutions. Borrowing from Haber et al.(2007), openness and competitiveness in a country’s 
6political system has a tendency to reflect itself in the openness and competitiveness of its 
financial system. Thus democracies by promoting political participation and competition limit 
the power of the state to control and repress the financial system, diminish the chance for both 
predatory and opportunistic behavior and consequently generate a more competitive and efficient 
banking system. Countries with greater constraints on the government provide greater protection 
against expropriation and consequently have a better banking system and more advanced stock 
markets (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). In the same vein the presence of competitive elections, 
political checks and balances are of crucial importance in property rights protection and contract 
enforcement (North & Weingast, 1989). 
2.2 Case of Africa
Several studies have investigated the effect of political variables on economic growth in 
Africa (Ghura, 1995; Ojo & Oshikoya, 1995; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Guillaumont et al., 
1999). Other works have examined the effect of political instability on savings or investment 
(Gyimah-Brempong & Traynor, 1996; 1999). To the best of our knowledge the absence of any 
study that addresses the relationship between finance and democracy in the African continent 
represents an important missing link in the literature. Given the relative importance of politics in 
financial and human developments; the recent waves of revolutions that have marked the Arab-
Spring; the established role institutions play in the rule of law, protection of private property 
rights  and enforcement  of contracts;  the  undeveloped  state  of financial  and democratic 
institutions in Africa; this paper seeks to investigate what role political regimes play in the 
development of financial intermediary dynamics. In plainer terms, the work assesses how 
distinguishing features like income-levels, colonial-legacies and religious-domination influence 
political regimes in their effect on financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. 
7Therefore the contribution of this paper to the literature could be summed-up in the 
concerns that have left political economists, researchers, governments and international policy 
makers pondering-over during the Arab Spring. How do national religious inclinations exert 
influence on financial dynamics? How do income levels matter in financial development? What 
bearing do legal origins have on financial development prospects? Do income-levels, dominant-
religions and colonial-legacies matter in the quality of political institutions? How do democracy 
and autocracy affect financial development dynamics conditional on religious-domination, legal- 
traditions and income-brackets?
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We examine a panel of 34 African countries (see Appendix 4) with data (see Appendix 3) 
from African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB). The resulting balanced panel is restricted from 1980 
to 2010 owing to constraints in data availability. For clarity in presentation, we classify selected 
variables into the following categories.
3.1.1 Dependent variables
a) Financial depth
Borrowing from the FDSD we measure financial depth both from overall-economic and 
financial system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial 
system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. Whereas the former represents the monetary base plus 
demand, saving and time deposits, the later denotes liquid liabilities. Since we are dealing 
exclusively with developing countries, we distinguish liquid liabilities from money supply 
8because a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 
2011e).  The two indicators are in ratios of GDP (see Appendix 3) and can robustly check each 
other as either account for over 97% of information in the other (see Appendix 2).
b) Financial intermediation efficiency
By financial efficiency here, we neither refer to the profitability-oriented concept nor to 
the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data 
Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What this paper seeks to elucidate is the ability of banks to 
effectively fulfill their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for 
economic operators. We employ indicators of banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-
efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on 
financial system deposits:  Fcfd’). Like with financial depth, these two financial allocation 
efficiency proxies can check each other as they represent more than 89% of variability in one 
another (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
In accordance with the FDSD we appreciate financial intermediary size as the ratio of 
“deposit bank assets” to the “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets: Dbacba). 
d) Financial activity
By financial intermediary activity here, the paper highlights the ability of banks to grant 
credit to economic operators.   We proxy for both bank-sector-activity and financial-sector-
activity with “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by domestic 
9banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. The later measure checks the former 
as it represents more than 92% of information in the former (see Appendix 2).
3.1.2 Independent variables
In accordance with the democracy-finance (growth) literature (Narayan et al., 2011; 
Yang, 2011) we measure political regimes with indicators of “Polity” and “Democracy” from 
the ADI of the WB. The Polity measure has been widely used in political science research and 
discloses the state’s level of democracy (about 89%: see Appendix 2) based on an evaluation of 
competitiveness, openness and level of participation at elections. To these measures we add an 
indicator of “Autocracy” for robustness purposes. 
3.1.3 First-stage control variables 
In line with the literature (Asongu, 2011d; Yang, 2011) we control for population growth, 
openness (trade) and public investment in the finance (democracy)-instrument regressions. It is 
worth noting these control variables are important at the first-stage regressions to confirm the 
strength of the instruments.   In the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation procedure, the 
instruments must be exogenous to the endogenous components of the independent variables 
conditional on other covariates (control variables). 
3.1.4 Second-stage control variables 
The choice of control variables at the second-stage of the IV procedure is very important 
for goodness of fit in model specification as they should be valid both from theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. Borrowing from the literature (Asongu, 2011d) the paper adopts inflation 
as the second-stage control variable. The empirical validity of the choice of this indicator is 
10presented in Table 2 of Section 4.2. Owing to limited degrees of freedom (from overidentifying 
restrictions test constraints), we stop at one control variable for the second-stage regressions. 
3.1.5 Instrumental variables 
Previous research (La Porta et al., 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Beck et al., 2003; 
Asongu, 2011ab; Yang, 2011) has demonstrated the correlation between political (financial) 
institutions and moment conditions of legal-origins, income-levels and religious-domination. 
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity
While democracy might account for financial development, a reverse causality cannot be 
ruled-out especially as market pressures do influence the quality of political institutions. This 
potential correlation between independent variables and the error term in the equation of interest 
is taken into account by an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique.
3.2.2 Estimation Technique
Siding with Beck et al. (2003) the paper adopts the Two-Stage-Least Squares (TSLS) 
with religious, income and legal-origin dynamics as instrumental variables. As highlighted 
earlier, the paper requires an estimation technique that takes account of endogeneity. The 
Instrumental Variable(IV) estimator can avoid the bias that Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) 
estimates are victim-of (absence of consistency) when independent variables are correlated with 
the error term in the equation of interest. Thus the IV model assesses how the moment conditions 
are instrumental in political-regime channels to financial development dynamics of depth, 
11efficiency, activity and size. Borrowing from Asongu (2011ab) the IV process of the paper shall 
adopt the following steps:
-justify the use of an IV over an OLS estimation technique via the Hausman-test for endogeneity;
-show that instrumental variables are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining 
variables (political-regime channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-verify if the instrumental dynamics are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the 
equation of interest through an Over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test. 
Thus the above methodology will include the following models:
First-stage regression: 
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         (2) 
In the two equations, X is a set of independent control variables. For the first and second 
equations,  v  and u, respectively denote the disturbance terms. Instrumental variables are legal-
origins, dominant-religions and income-levels. 
3.2.2 Robustness checks  
In order to assess the robustness of results, the paper: (1) uses alternative indicators of 
each   financial   dynamic;   (2)   employs   different   measures   of   democracy;   (3)   adopts   two 
interchangeable sets of instruments; (4) assesses the validity of African results with sub-Saharan 
African regressions (excluding South Africa and North African countries). 
124. Empirical Analysis 
This  section presents  results from panel  regressions  to assess the importance  of 
instrumental dynamics in explaining cross-country variances in financial development dynamics, 
the ability of instrumental variables to explain cross-country differences in political-regime 
institutions and the ability of the exogenous components of political-regime channels to account 
for cross-country differences financial development dynamics.
4.1 Finance and instruments
In Table 1, we regress the financial intermediary dynamics on the instruments. We 
classify the instrumental variables into two sets to avoid issues related to multicolinearity and 
overparametization. Thus we regress proxies for each indicator within each financial dynamic on 
a distinct set of instruments. Our use of alternative indicators with different sets of instruments at 
every phase of the analysis ensures the robustness of the findings. The results in the Table 1 
indicate that distinguishing African countries by income-levels, religious-domination and legal-
origins helps explain cross-country differences in financial development. These findings have 
been documented by an extensive literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; 
Beck et al., 2003) and very recently confirmed in the law (democracy)-finance literature 
(Asongu, 2011ab; Yang, 2011). Even after controlling  for trade, public investment  and 
population growth, the instrumental dynamics enter jointly significantly in all regressions at a 
1% significance level. 
The dominance of English common-law (French civil-law) countries in prospects of 
financial depth, activity and size (efficiency) is in line with recent African law-finance literature 
(Asongu, 2011abcdf). Results also indicate Christian-dominated countries have higher (lower) 
levels of financial efficiency (depth) than their Islam-oriented counterparts. Income-levels also 
13matter in financial development as poorer countries have a lower propensity to improve their 
financial dynamics than wealthier countries. This postulation can be further certified in the role 
Upper Middle Income (UMI) countries play in Middle Income (MI) elasticities. While Lower 
Middle Income (LMI) effects are negative, their combined effect with UMI countries in the MI 
elasticity is positive. 
Table 1:  Finance and instruments 
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Financial Size
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba
1
st Set  2
nd Set  1
st Set  2
nd Set  1
st Set  2
nd Set  1
st Set  2
nd Set 
Instruments 
Constant 0.400*** 0.203*** 0.637*** 0.907*** 0.276*** 0.208*** 0.533*** 0.527***
(15.05) (9.818) (11.84) (14.10) (12.71) (7.906) (21.55) (34.26)
English   --- 0.055*** --- -0.352*** --- 0.034** -0.103***
(4.840) (-9.956) (2.412) (-7.535)
French  -0.029** --- 0.383*** --- 0.001 0.103***
(-2.315) (12.60) (0.139) (7.535)
Christianity --- -0.041*** --- 0.161*** --- 0.004 -0.002
(-3.526) (4.444) (0.289) (-0.177)
Islam  0.067*** --- -0.056* --- 0.017 0.002
(5.178) (-1.748) (1.609) (0.177)
L.Income -0.141*** --- -0.099*** --- -0.131*** -0.112***
(-9.358) (-2.840) (-10.68) (-6.992)
M. Income --- 0.187*** --- 0.260*** --- 0.276** 0.201***
(12.27) (5.486) (14.30) (10.15)
LMIncome --- -0.047*** --- -0.136*** --- -0.123*** -0.089***
(-2.966) (-2.769) (-6.139) (-4.290)
UMIncome 0.037** --- -0.011 --- 0.062*** 0.089***
(2.118) (-0.262) (4.331) (4.290)
Control 
Variables
Trade -0.0003** -0.0003** --- -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(-2.061) (-2.013) (-3.320) (-3.001) (-5.580) (10.19) (10.19)
Public Ivt. 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.007** -0.005 0.002* 0.0007 --- ---
(5.101) (5.337) (-2.209) (-1.381) (1.688) (0.461)
Pop. growth -0.027*** -0.029*** 0.049*** 0.044*** -0.012*** -0.017*** --- ---
(-5.071) (-5.951) (3.742) (2.915) (-2.749) (-2.761)
Adjusted R² 0.258 0.304 0.176 0.169 0.260 0.234 0.295 0.295
Fisher-test 42.234*** 53.055*** 31.878*** 25.221*** 42.672*** 37.542*** 80.070*** 80.070***
Observations 830 834 868 834 829 836 945 945
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit (Banking Intermediary System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on 
Financial deposits (Financial Intermediary System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit (Banking Intermediary Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit from 
domestic banks and other financial institutions (Financial Intermediary Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposits banks plus central bank assets 
(Financial size). L: Low. LM: Lower Middle. UM: Upper Middle. Ivt: Investment. Pop: population. *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
4.2 Political regimes and instruments
Table 2 investigates the role of instrumental dynamics in the quality of political 
institutions and the validity of the inflation indicator as a control variable at the second-stage of 
14the IV approach. This first-stage regression is the initial condition for the IV process where-in 
the  endogenous   components   of the  political-regime  channels   must  be  explained  by  the 
instruments conditional on other covariates (control variables). Clearly it could be seen that 
distinguishing African countries by the instrumental dynamics helps elucidate cross-country 
differences in political institutions. Also the validity of inflation as a control-variable is in line 
with recent empirical literature (Asongu, 2011f) where-in, the low level of inflation expressed by 
Francophone African civil-law countries is associated with their fixed-exchange rate regimes.
On average English common-law (Islam-oriented) countries have better democratic 
institutions that their French civil-law (Christian) counterparts. This finding is antagonistic to the 
democracy deficiency conclusions in the Arab world of El  Badawi, & Makdisi(2007). Two 
important circumstances surrounding the difference in results are worth pointing-out. (1) While 
El Badawi, & Makdisi(2007) used all countries in the Arab World and compared them with 
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and OECD countries, the framework of this paper’s 
comparative analysis is exclusively Africa. (2) In their study oil is negatively associated with 
democracy; which is evident given the proportion of Arab countries’ production of oil on a 
global comparative scale. However, in Africa oil is produced by both Moslem and Christian 
nations.  There is evidence of a U-shape relationship between national wealth and the level of 
democracy with Low-income countries experiencing lower (higher) levels of democracy than 
Upper (Lower) middle income countries. 
15Table 2: Endogenous independent variables and instruments (First-Stage regressions)
Endogenous Explaining Variables (EEV) Control  EEV
Democracy Polity(Revised) Autocracy Inflation
1
st Set  2
nd Set  1
st Set  2
nd Set  1
st Set  2
nd Set  1
st Set  2
nd Set 
Instruments
Constant 1.475*** 1.061** -1.158 -0.106 2.805*** 1.109** 23.827*** 6.700**
(2.765) (2.364) (-1.407) (-0.154) (4.853) (2.281) (7.966) (2.502)
English   --- 2.138*** --- 2.651*** -0.418 15.069***
(8.396) (6.747) (-1.518) (10.40)
French  -2.138*** -2.651*** 0.418 -15.06***
(-8.396) (-6.747) (1.518) (-10.40)
Christianity --- -0.485* --- -0.373 -0.065 0.212
(-1.838) (-0.918) (-0.230) (0.138)
Islam  0.485* 0.373 0.065 -0.212
(1.838) (0.918) (0.230) (-0.138)
L.Income 1.239*** 3.329*** -2.180*** -1.845
(4.094) (7.127) (-6.650) (-1.079)
M. Income --- 2.207*** --- 2.382*** -0.111 -1.723
(6.459) (4.520) (-0.300) (-0.909)
LMIncome --- -3.446*** --- -5.711*** 2.291*** 3.569*
(-9.651) (-10.37) (5.926) (1.816)
UMIncome 3.446*** 5.711**** -2.291*** -3.569*
(9.651) (10.37) (-5.926) (-1.816)
Control 
Variables 
Trade 0.008** 0.008** 0.011** 0.011** -0.003 -0.003 -0.099*** -0.099***
(2.227) (2.227) (1.987) (1.987) (-0.940) (-0.940) (-4.811) (-4.811)
Public Ivt. 0.052* 0.052* -0.054 -0.054 0.110*** 0.110*** -0.067 -0.067
(1.784) (1.784) (-1.213) (-1.213) (3.501) (3.501) (-0.407) (-0.407)
Pop. growth -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.891*** -0.891*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 2.111*** 2.111***
(-2.929) (-2.929) (-5.402) (-5.402) (4.922) (4.922) (3.429) (3.429)
Adjusted R² 0.206 0.206 0.207 0.207 0.093 0.093 0.134 0.134
Fisher-test 34.439*** 34.439*** 34.555*** 34.555*** 14.249*** 14.249*** 19.998*** 19.998***
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 899 855 855
L: Low. LM: Lower Middle. UM:Upper Middle. Ivt: Investment. Pop: population. *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
4.3 Finance and democracy 
Table 3 investigates two main concerns: (1) the issue of if the exogenous components of 
political-regime  channels  explain  finance conditional  on the instruments  and;  (2) if the 
instruments help explain financial dynamics beyond political-regime channels. To make these 
investigations we use the IV regressions. This entails a simultaneous examination of equations 
(1) and (2). While the first issue is addressed by the significance of the estimated coefficients, 
the second is assessed by the overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test whose null hypothesis is the 
position that, instruments do not explain finance beyond political-regime channels. Robustness 
checks are carried-out at three stages: (1) the use of alternative indicators of political-regimes 
and financial dynamics;  (2) the political channels are instrumented with two different  sets of 
16moment conditions; (3) an independent regression for SSA countries(excluding South Africa) is 
performed  for the consistency of  continental results.
Table 3: Second-Stage regressions 
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial  Activity Financial  Size
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba
Constant -0.319* -0.347** 1.060*** 1.294*** -0.294** -0.290* 0.211 0.233*
(-1.827) (-2.376) (6.776) (7.491) (-2.127) (-1.960) (1.439) (1.673)
Democracy 0.092*** --- -0.014 --- 0.074*** --- 0.093*** ---
(4.038) (-0.708) (4.366) (4.446)
Polity 2(Revised) --- 0.086*** --- -0.008 --- 0.094*** --- 0.090***
(4.710) (-0.399) (4.937) (4.580)
Autocracy  0.144*** 0.216*** 0.019 -0.030 0.115*** 0.208*** 0.124*** 0.210***
(3.767) (4.512) (0.580) (-0.540) (3.770) (4.260) (3.810) (4.446)
Inflation  -0.007** -0.005** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(-2.420) (-2.177) (-7.426) (-7.434) (-3.345) (-3.534) (-4.023) (-4.155)
Hausman-test 194.26*** 226.96*** 96.046*** 79.366*** 241.51*** 162.424*** 168.681*** 168.97***
OIR-Sargan test 0.326 0.000 0.233 2.647 0.048 0.946 0.245 0.121
P-value [0.567] [0.978] [0.629] [0.103] [0.825] [0.330] [0.620] [0.727]
Cragg-Donald 4.183 4.902 4.751 4.902 4.349 4.679 5.000 5.281
Adjusted R² 0.012 0.021 0.067 0.047 0.033 0.027 0.058 0.063
Fisher Statistics  6.004*** 7.587*** 32.306*** 24.703*** 7.778*** 9.074*** 8.583*** 9.092***
Observations  909 913 945 913 908 915 914 914
Initial Instruments  Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Robust Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit 
(Banking Intermediary System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial Intermediary System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private 
domestic credit (Banking Intermediary Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions (Financial Intermediary 
Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposits banks plus central bank assets (Financial size). L: Low. LM: Lower Middle. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions.
We first justify the choice of the IV estimation technique with the Hausman test for 
endogeneity. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that estimators by OLS are efficient 
and consistent. Thus a rejection of this null hypothesis attests to the presence of endogeneity; in 
which case the independent variables are correlated with the error term in the equation of 
interest. Results fully validate the presence of endogeneity in all eight models.  As concerns the 
first-issue, which is resolved by the significance of the estimates, it could be concluded that 
autocratic-regimes are more instrumental in financial dynamics of depth, activity and size. These 
findings are broadly consistent with the literature (Olson, 1982; Bhagwati, 1995; Blachard & 
Shleifer, 2000). 
17Owing to the relatively undeveloped state of African economies, democracies lend 
themselves to popular demands for immediate consumption at the expense of profitable 
investments for financial development. By the same token democracies could be prone to 
conflicts resulting from social, ethnic and class struggles that retard financial intermediary 
activities due to instability. In summary, democracy in the African continent presents a potential 
risk to financial development because it may be open to pressures from interest groups (Olson, 
1982). On the contrary authoritarian regimes in Africa suppress conflicts, resist sectional 
interests and take coercive measures for rapid financial intermediary development. Our results on 
financial depth and activity confirm the findings of Rao (1984) who postulated that authoritarian 
regimes orchestrate economic growth by sacrificing current consumption for investment, which 
makes them rather effective at mobilizing savings. Mobilized savings is a direct source of liquid 
liabilities and growth in money supply. Most African democracies are dysfunctional and thus 
rampant local capture and competition for rents seriously undermines the development of the 
financial sector. Conversely, authoritarian regimes with political centralization reduce both the 
risk of capture and the scope of competition for rents by local governments. In financial 
development policies in the continent, authoritarian regimes could better orchestrate mechanisms 
for effective mobilization of savings for investment.
As concerns the second issue, it could be said that the instruments do not explain finance 
beyond political-regime channels; implying they (instruments) are valid and do not suffer from 
the inconvenience of endogeneity as the endogenous independent variables. The control variable 
(inflation) is significant with the right sign; as inflation seriously hampers financial intermediary 
development.
18Table 4 shows results of SSA countries excluding South Africa. Thus we also rule-out 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia from the initial data set. But for financial intermediary 
aspects of depth and efficiency, results are specifically consistent with those in Table 3. Findings 
for financial depth and efficiency are also broadly consistent with those reported in Table 3.  The 
only difference in interpretation with respect the depth and efficiency channels is that the 
instruments do not explain finance only through political-regime mechanisms. This partial 
invalidity of the instruments does not however change the general interpretation of the results. In 
both tables 3 and 4, for robustness purposes we replicate the regressions with the second set of 
instrumental variables and find no change in the results. 
Drawing on recent democracy–finance literature, the findings in the paper complement 
those of Yang (2011) who has found a positive relationship between democracy and bank sector 
development. However it is worth pointing out Yang’s work is of global appeal and used only 
one indicator of bank sector development (bank credit).  The positive link is only present in 
cross-country regressions and disappears in regressions controlling for country-specific factors. 
While this paper does not investigate the stock market dimension owning to relatively scares 
data, Yang (2011) found no significant relationship between democracy and stock market 
development. So again we complement Yang (2011) with a measure of authoritarian regimes for 
which comparative estimates indicate: while democracy is instrumental in financial intermediary 
development, authoritarian regimes would be more instrumental in an African context.  Overall, 
our results are consistent with Mulligan et al. (2004) who found that democracies have important 
effects on the degree of competition for public offices but less significant effects in comparison 
with autocracy on policies towards financial development. 
19Table 4: Second-Stage regressions without South Africa and Northern Africa
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial  Activity Financial  Size
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba
Constant -0.055 -0.192 1.131*** 1.346*** -0.155 -0.088 0.214 0.231
(-0.504) (-1.587) (5.199) (6.035) (-1.332) (-0.936) (1.226) (1.368)
Democracy 0.047*** --- -0.014 --- 0.044*** --- 0.073** ---
(3.428) (-0.508) (3.002) (3.013)
Polity 2(Revised) --- 0.057*** --- -0.047 --- 0.036*** --- 0.073***
(3.663) (-1.629) (2.951) (3.040)
Autocracy  0.061** 0.134*** 0.027 -0.052 0.076*** 0.098*** 0.130*** 0.200***
(2.241) (3.027) (0.514) (-0.641) (2.638) (2.834) (2.915) (3.156)
Inflation  -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(-0.517) (-0.420) (-7.382) (-7.344) (-2.742) (-2.683) (-3.354) (-3.403)
Hausman-test 76.072*** 147.181*** 179.669*** 220.813*** 99.964*** 58.158*** 81.674*** 81.609***
OIR-Sargan 4.578** 4.635** 9.625*** 3.699* 0.364 1.498 0.251 0.271
P-value [0.032] [0.031] [0.001] [0.054] [0.546] [0.220] [0.616] [0.602]
Cragg-Donald 1.810 2.065 2.491 2.065 2.006 2.065 2.548 2.603
Adjusted R² 0.002 0.009 0.075 0.095 0.022 0.019 0.047 0.049
Fisher Statistics  6.253*** 6.800*** 33.309*** 41.201*** 3.427** 3.286** 4.351*** 4.433***
Observations  767 773 804 773 773 773 769 769
Initial Instruments  Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Robust Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank 
deposit(Banking   Intermediary System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits(Financial Intermediary System Efficiency). Pcrb: 
Private domestic credit( Banking Intermediary Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions(Financial 
Intermediary Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposits banks plus central bank assets(Financial size). L:Low. LM: Lower Middle. OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions.
4.4 Further discussion, caveats and policy recommendations
The edge of authoritarian regimes as implied by our findings could also be elucidated 
from cross-country differences in good governance policies. Thus, political regimes provide the 
regulatory environment for financial development. This implies  the absence of adequate 
mechanisms that uphold the control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability or 
no violence, voice and accountability, rule of law and regulatory quality, could seriously infringe 
on the proper development of the financial intermediary sector. 
There is an elaborate bulk of qualitative literature that provides exhaustive case studies 
depicting how corruption (good governance) increases (decreases) with the advent of democracy. 
This is the case with many developing countries in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972), Southeast Asia 
(Scott, 1972), India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977). It is also the case of post- 
20communist   Russia   (Varsee,   1997)   and   many   Latin   American   countries   after   waves   of 
democratization (Weyland, 1998). This contradictory relationship between democracy and 
corruption has been confirmed by quantitative studies (Harris-White & White, 1996; Sung, 
2004). 
Our findings could further be elucidated through two hypotheses highlighting the non-
linear relationship between political regimes and management effectiveness in the financial 
system. The time and level hypotheses have been tested independently to validate the existence 
of a non-linear relationship between democracy and financial institutional quality. Concerning 
the level of democracy hypothesis, it has been found using continuous measures of political 
regimes that institutional quality is highest in strongly democratic states, medium in strongly 
authoritarian regimes and least in states that are partially democratized. With respect to these 
varying empirical specifications, the level oriented non-linearity has been defined as either U-
shaped (Montinola & Jackman, 2002), S-shaped (Sung, 2004), or J-shaped (Back & Hadenius, 
2008). According to the time of exposure hypothesis, Keefer (2007) has shown that younger 
democracies produce worse institutions than older ones. In summary, the general idea in this 
explanation is that partial or young democracies perform worse (worst) than authoritarian (full or 
older democratic) regimes. It follows that most African countries are young democracies which 
establish institutions that govern the financial intermediary sector less efficiently than in 
authoritarian regimes. 
As a policy implication, once democracy is initiated, it should be accelerated (to edge the 
appeals of authoritarian regimes) and reap the benefits of level and time hypotheses in financial 
development.
215. Conclusion
This aim of this paper has been to explore the impact of political-regime channels on 
financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size, conditional on income-
level, legal-origin and religious instrumental variables. Findings could be summarized in the 
following. (1) Authoritarian regimes have a higher propensity to effect policies that favor the 
development of financial intermediary depth, activity and size. (2) Christian-dominated countries 
have higher (lower) levels of financial efficiency (depth) than their Islam-oriented counterparts. 
(3) Income-levels also matter in financial development as poorer countries have a much lower 
propensity to improve their financial dynamics than wealthier countries. (4) On average English 
common-law   countries   have   better   democratic   institutions   than   their   French   civil-law 
counterparts. (5) There is evidence of a U-shape relationship between national wealth and the 
level of democracy with Low-income countries experiencing lower (higher) levels of democracy 
than Upper (Lower) middle income countries.
In a nutshell democracies have important effects on the degree of competition for 
public offices but otherwise have less significant effects in comparison with authoritarian 
regimes on policies towards financial intermediary development.  As a policy implication, once 
democracy is initiated, it should be accelerated (to edge the appeals of authoritarian regimes) and 
reap the benefits of level and time hypotheses in financial development.
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Appendix 1: Summary Statistics





Money Supply 0.299 0.190 0.001 1.141 938
Liquid Liabilities 0.228 0.174 0.001 0.948 942
Financial 
Efficiency
Banking  System Efficiency 0.856 0.517 0.070 5.411 1003
Financial System Efficiency 0.897 0.505 0.139 3.979 942
Financial 
Activity 
Banking System Activity 0.176 0.155 0.001 0.869 937
Financial System Activity 0.200 0.211 0.001 1.739 944
Fin. Size Financial System Size 0.686 0.235 0.017 1.609 971
Democracy/ 
Autocracy 
Democracy Democracy Index 1.904 3.799 -8.000 10.000 1054
Polity Index(Revised) -1.701 5.978 -10.000 10.000 1054





Population growth 2.563 1.117 -8.271 10.043 1054
Public Investment 7.649 4.211 0.000 31.047 899
Trade 68.175 37.041 6.320 275.23 1012
2





English Common-Law 0.441 0.496 0.000 1.000 1054
French Civil-Law 0.558 0.496 0.000 1.000 1054
Religion  Christianity 0.617 0.486 0.000 1.000 1054
Islam 0.382 0.486 0.000 1.000 1054
Income 
Levels
Low Income 0.529 0.499 0.000 1.000 1054
Middle Income 0.470 0.499 0.000 1.000 1054
Lower Middle Income 0.294 0.455 0.000 1.000 1054
Upper Middle Income 0.176 0.381 0.000 1.000 1054
S.D: Standard  Deviation . Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum. Obser : Observations. 
23Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis    
Financial  Development  Dependent Variables  Endogenous  Control Variables Instrumental  Variables
F. Depth F. Efficiency F. Activity F.Size Independent Variables First-Stage (F.S) S.S Law Religion Income Levels
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dem Auto Pol1 Pol2 Popg PubI Trade Infl. Eng. Frch Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI
1.000 0.972 -0.11 -0.07 0.74 0.627 0.403 0.14 0.019 0.090 0.081 -0.28 0.160 0.148 -0.12 -0.02 0.028 -0.175 0.175 -0.41 0.412 0.249 0.238 M2
1.000 -0.12 -0.05 0.78 0.705 0.459 0.21 0.001 0.149 0.135 -0.32 0.159 0.206 -0.12 0.068 -0.06 -0.101 0.101 -0.44 0.448 0.238 0.299 Fdgdp
1.00 0.89 0.35 0.298 0.242 -0.11 0.090 -0.146 -0.13 0.078 -0.05 -0.048 -0.23 -0.38 0.388 -0.099 0.099 -0.07 0.072 0.057 0.026 BcBd
1.00 0.44 0.507 0.269 -0.02 0.089 -0.075 -0.07 0.085 -0.06 -0.098 -0.24 -0.33 0.339 0.039 -0.039 -0.10 0.104 0.008 0.126 FcFd
1.00 0.926 0.542 0.19 0.022 0.124 0.113 -0.24 0.044 0.145 -0.19 -0.07 0.075 -0.092 0.092 -0.46 0.466 0.230 0.333 Pcrb
1.000 0.479 0.21 -0.03 0.164 0.167 -0.22 -0.02 0.058 -0.15 0.008 -0.00 -0.009 0.009 -0.39 0.394 0.127 0.361 Pcrbof
1.000 0.17 -0.02 0.136 0.131 -0.14 0.11 0.390 -0.41 -0.15 0.150 -0.009 0.009 -0.40 0.408 202 0.306 Dbacba
1.00 -0.19 0.89 0.757 -0.12 0.076 0.190 -0.01 0.298 -0.29 0.084 -0.084 -0.05 0.057 -0.17 0.283 Demo
1.000 -0.596 -0.78 0.144 0.107 -0.003 0.048 -0.10 0.104 -0.051 0.051 -0.09 0.096 0.193 -0.10 Auto
1.000 0.958 -0.16 0.014 0.140 -0.03 0.269 -0.26 0.076 -0.076 0.016 -0.01 -0.23 0.261 Polity1
1.000 -0.17 -0.01 0.125 -0.04 0.263 -0.26 0.090 -0.090 0.022 -0.02 -0.23 0.25 Polity 2
1.000 -0.03 -0.124 0.124 -0.04 0.048 0.064 -0.064 0.211 -0.21 -0.14 -0.10 Popg
1.000 0.269 -0.07 -0.04 0.043 -0.022 0.022 -0.04 0.046 0.016 0.039 PubI
1.000 -0.12 0.238 -0.23 0.185 -0.185 -0.39 0.397 0.196 0.283 Trade
1.000 0.329 -0.32 0.061 -0.061 0.090 -0.09 -0.01 -0.09 Inflation
1.000 -1.00 0.211 -0.211 0.007 -0.00 -0.05 0.054 English
1.000 -0.211 0.211 -0.00 0.007 0.05 -0.05 French
1.000 -1.000 0.107 -0.10 -0.28 0.205 Christian
1.000 -0.10 0.107 0.289 -0.20 Islam
1.000 -1.00 -0.68 -0.49 Lower I
1.000 0.684 0.491 Middle I
1.000 -0.29 L Middle I
1.000 U Middle I
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit (Banking Intermediary System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial Intermediary System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private 
domestic credit (Banking Intermediary Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions (Financial Intermediary Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposits banks plus central bank assets 
(Financial size). Demo: Democracy. Poli: Polity. Auto: Autocracy. Popg: population growth. PubI: Public Investment. Infl: Inflation.. S.S: Second-Stage control variable. Eng: English Common-Law. Frch. French Civil-Law. Chris:  
Christianity. LI: Low Income Countries. MI: Middle Income Countries. LMI: Lower Middle Income Countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income Countries. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of  the Press. NFree: No  
Freedom of the Press
                          
                                         
         
24Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables  Sign Variable Definitions Sources
Democracy  Demo Institutionalized Democracy(-10  to +10)  World Bank(WDI)
Polity  Pol Revised Combined  Polity Score (-10  to +10) World Bank(WDI)
Autocracy  Auto Institutionalized Autocracy (-10  to +10) World Bank(WDI)
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Prices (Annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Openness  Trade  Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP
World Bank(WDI)
Public  Investment  PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth  Popg Average annual population growth rate  World Bank(WDI)
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Economic financial 
depth(Money Supply)





Fdgdp Financial system deposits(% of GDP)   World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system 
allocation efficiency
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
allocation efficiency
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits 
World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions(% of GDP)
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks assets 
plus deposit bank assets
World Bank(FDSD)
Trade: Openness. G.E: Government Final Expenditure. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: 
Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit 
by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank 
assets plus deposit bank assets. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. 
25Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num
Law
English Common-Law Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, 
15
French Civil-Law Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 





Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ivory 
Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, 
21
Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, The Gambia, Mali, 




Low Income  Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Niger, Rwanda,  Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Tanzania, 
18
Middle Income Algeria ,Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco,  Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
16
Lower Middle Income  Cameroon,  Ivory Coast, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
10
Upper Middle Income  Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritius, South 
Africa, 
6
Num: Number of cross sections(countries)
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